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ABSTRACT
After decades of internal civil conflict, a peaceful popular
revolution toppled longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir in April 2019.
The popular revolution paved the way for the transitional
government of Sudan to negotiate the October 2020 Juba Peace
Agreement, a comprehensive peace agreement with a coalition of
regional armed movements. The 2019 revolution and the 2020 peace
process created the opportunity for Sudan to transition to a peaceful
multi-ethnic participatory democracy with shared constitutional
powers, economic prosperity, and respect for human rights
throughout all of Sudan. The popular revolution and peace process
also laid the groundwork for the establishment of transitional justice
and accountability mechanisms for the human rights atrocities
committed by the Bashir regime and other parties to Sudan’s
decades-long violent internal conflicts. Despite the October 2021
military coup of Sudan’s transitional government near the one-year
anniversary of the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement, a
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restoration of the democratic transition remains possible. The
groundwork laid by the Juba Peace Agreement provides Sudan with
a peaceful way forward. This Article serves as a case study of the
world’s most recently concluded peace process. The Article begins
by assessing the peace process and the Juba Peace Agreement using
the theoretical peace versus justice framework. In subsequent
Sections, this Article examines how themes of peace and justice have
unfolded in past Sudanese peace processes and situates the Juba
peace process within that history. Through this case study, the
Article makes clear that the 2019 popular revolution paved the way
for the Juba peace process to address issues of peace and transitional
justice in a more fulsome way than would have been possible with
a Bashir led government. By bringing the parties to Sudan’s ongoing
violent conflicts to agreement on peace, justice, and a political path
forward, the Juba Peace Agreement lays a clear roadmap to a
peaceful and democratic Sudan. With sustained domestic support
and international engagement, the Juba Peace Agreement’s
significant promise can withstand the current volatility of Sudan’s
political transition.
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INTRODUCTION

In April 2019, a popular revolution galvanized the toppling of
Sudan’s dictator Omar al-Bashir.1 The revolution opened the door
for regional armed groups to negotiate a long term, comprehensive
peace agreement with the newly installed transitional government.2
The year-long negotiation culminated in the multi-track Juba
agreement signed on October 3, 2020.3 The Juba Agreement was not
the first agreement to be signed between armed opposition groups
and the Sudanese national government.4 However, as this Article
explains, the toppling of Bashir and the creation of a new transitional
government that included opposition civilian leaders 5 paved the
way for the completion of a peace agreement addressing
accountability for international crimes which had long been a thorny
issue in Sudan’s peace negotiations, particularly following Bashir’s
indictment by the ICC in 2009. 6 With Bashir gone and the
establishment of a new transition government that included civilian
representatives from his opposition, the peace negotiations
proceeded with greater alignment of interests on both sides of the
table. The Juba negotiation was not without its challenges; the
newly formed transitional government contained military officials
who had been part of Bashir’s regime and controlled military forces
that had committed grave human rights violations. 7 Within the
See infra Part II.
Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan Between the Transitional Government
of Sudan and the Parties to Peace Process, Oct. 3, 2020 [hereinafter Juba Peace
Agreement],
https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/202103/Juba%20Agreement%20for%20Peace%20in%20Sudan%20%20Official%20ENGLISH.PDF [https://perma.cc/X23K-83VN].
3
Id.
4
See infra Part IV. See generally GENE CAROLAN, AUTONOMY, SECESSION, AND
THE TIES THAT BIND: LESSONS FROM THE PEACE AGREEMENTS OF THE SUDAN (2018) (for
historical overview of peace agreements signed between armed groups and
Sudanese central government).
5
Dame Rosalind Marsden, Can Sudan Achieve Piece and Democratic Transition?,
CHATHAM HOUSE (Aug. 9, 2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/08/cansudan-achieve-peace-and-democratic-transition [https://perma.cc/K8YX-4AKM].
6
See generally INT’L CRISIS GRP., SUDAN: JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC (2009),
https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Sudan__Justice_peace_and_the_ICC.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y52Z-ERVE].
7
Samuel Ramani, Sudan’s Imperiled Political Transition, CARNEGIE MIDDLE E.
CTR. (Mar. 17, 2021), https://carnegie-mec.org/2021/03/17/sudan-s-imperiledpolitical-transition-pub-84077 [https://perma.cc/8TJG-NFBD]. The ability of
1
2
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negotiation, accountability remained a central priority for many
Sudanese victims of the Bashir regime, particularly those from the
conflict regions of Darfur and the Two Areas of the Blue Nile and
South Kordofan.8 Despite this difficult history, the parties were able
to reach agreement on certain transitional justice and accountability
measures.9
Scholars have long debated whether and to what extent justice
and accountability measures should be addressed in peace
negotiations seeking to end an active conflict.10 The Sudanese peace
process offers an excellent case study for exploring the longstanding
issues that animate the peace versus justice dilemma. This Article
will commence in the following parts. Part II of the Article provides
background on the longstanding conflicts in Sudan and the
circumstances that led to the Spring 2019 revolution that toppled
Omar al-Bashir. Part III of the Article provides a survey of the
theoretical frameworks that evolved out of the peace versus justice
dilemma. Part IV applies the peace versus justice conceptual
framework to prior peace negotiations in Sudan. Part V explores
how concepts of peace and justice unfolded within the context of the
Juba negotiations and the Juba peace agreement. Part VI concludes
by forecasting how peace and justice may unfold in Sudan’s political
transition in light of the Juba Peace Agreement.

Bashir-era military officials to retain power in the transitional government
threatened to undermine the peaceful democratic transition, as seen by the military
coup attempt against Prime Minister Hamdook on October 24, 2021. Declan Walsh,
Abdi Latif Dahir & Simon Marks, Sudan’s Military Seizes Power, Casting Democratic
Transition Into Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Oct. 29, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/25/world/africa/sudan-military-coup.html
[https://perma.cc/T4AY-Y4N9]. At the time of publication of this Article, the
duration of the coup and its impact on the democratic transition remain uncertain.
Protesters have returned to the streets against the military officials who staged the
coup. Killian Clarke and Mai Hassan, This Is How to Stop the Coup in Sudan, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/29/opinion/sudancoup-military.html [https://perma.cc/9L5T-URRC].
8
This was the author’s observation from his conversations with opposition
parties negotiating the Juba Peace Agreement from Darfur and the Two Areas.
Surdarsan Raghavan, In violence between Sudan and South Sudan, ‘echoes of Darfur’,
WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/violencebetween-two-sudans-has-echoes-of-darfur/2012/03/09/gIQALukS3R_story.html
[https://perma.cc/HA8U-65MG].
9
See infra Part V.
10
See infra Part III.
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II. OMAR AL-BASHIR’S REGIME AND THE SPRING 2019 REVOLUTION
Sudan is an immensely diverse, multi-ethnic, multi-religious
state which, prior to its 2011 partition into Sudan and South Sudan,
was the tenth largest country on the planet, constituting two percent
of the world’s land mass—approximately the size of all of
continental Western Europe.11 Historic Sudan comprises 597 tribes
and subtribes who speak 133 languages and even more dialects.12 In
addition to these numerous tribal and ethnic identities, many of
Sudanese self-identify on racial grounds as African or Arab, and
practice Islam, Christianity, and various traditional African
religions. 13 Division along tribal, racial, and religious grounds,
along with resource competition, has been an ongoing source of
conflict in Sudan.14 Since gaining its independence from Britain and
Egypt in 1956, Sudan has struggled with political instability, moving
between authoritarianism and brief periods of democracy at the
national level. Sudan has consistently faced civil conflict between
the capital in Khartoum and the South, as well as between the capital
and marginalized regions including Darfur, the Blue Nile, the Nuba
Mountains, and east Sudan.15 All of Sudan’s internal divisions and
conflicts were exacerbated by the policies of Omar al-Bashir after he
seized control of the country.
a. Omar al-Bashir’s Regime
Omar al-Bashir’s thirty year dictatorship began in 1989 when
Bashir led a coup against Sudan’s democratically-elected Prime
Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi.16 Brigadier General al-Bashir and a group
of midlevel Army officers removed, arrested, and imprisoned Prime
11
ANDREW S. NATSIOS, SUDAN, SOUTH SUDAN, AND DARFUR: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW 8 (2012).
12
Id. at 10.
13
Id. at 11-12.
14
Id. at 12-13.
15
See LUTZ OETTE & MOHAMED ABDELSALAM BABIKER, CONSTITUTION-MAKING
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SUDANS 2 (2019); see also Brian A. Kritz & Jacqueline
Wilson, No Transitional Justice Without Transition: Darfuri—A Case Study, 19 MICH.
ST. J. INT’L L. 475, 476-77 (2011).
16
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 80; see also Mila Versteeg, Timothy Horley,
Anne Meng, Mauricio Guim, and Marilyn Guirguis, The Law and Politics of
Presidential Term Limit Evasion, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 173, 221 (2020).
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Minister al-Mahdi, one hundred senior military officers, and twenty
political figures. 17 Bashir was backed by a Sudanese minority
Islamist political party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), and its
spiritual leader, Hassan al-Turabi.18 Bashir instituted a dictatorial
Islamist state predicated on the political philosophies of Turabi.19
Bashir and Turabi transformed Sudan into an Islamist state
governed by sharia law by filling the military and state institutions
with loyal Islamists, creating a new court system based on sharia
law, requiring the banking system to conform to Islamic principles,
and banning respected secular institutions, such as the Sudanese Bar
Association. 20 These changes, and the civil conflicts discussed
herein, led nearly two million secular professionals and young
people to flee Sudan.21
While transforming Sudan into an Islamic state domestically,
Bashir also transformed Sudan into a pariah state globally. 22
Bashir’s foreign policy supported international terrorist groups and
his domestic policy fomented grave human rights violations and
genocide. Turabi’s political and religious philosophy called for a
world Islamic uprising23 and in furtherance of this grand strategy,
Turabi funneled weapons to Islamist revolutionaries in Egypt,
Libya, and Tunisia. 24 The Bashir regime also opened Sudan’s
territory for any citizen of an Arab nation to enter and reside without
a visa.25 This policy led to a number of extremists moving to Sudan,

17
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 80; see also Alan Cowell, Military Coup In Sudan
Ousts
Civilian
Regime,
N.
Y.
TIMES
(July
1,
1989),
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/01/world/military-coup-in-sudan-oustscivilian-regime.html [https://perma.cc/BKY3-DR2D].
18
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 80, 80-83.
19
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 80, 87-90.
20 See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 87-90; see also Declan Walsh, The Fall of Omar
Hassan al-Bashir, the ‘Spider’ at the Heart of Sudan’s Web, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/world/africa/omar-bashir-sudan.html
[https://perma.cc/F7MD-DSJ4].
21
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 90; see also South Sudan: civilians fleeing violence
nears 2 million with no likelihood of return soon, UN NEWS (Sept. 24, 2014),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2014/09/478442 [https://perma.cc/6E7X-FRSE].
22
Herman J. Cohen, The Roots of Sudan’s Upheaval, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS.
(May 9, 2019, 4:31 PM), https://www.cfr.org/blog/roots-sudans-upheaval
[https://perma.cc/ZB38-87E8].
23
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 7.
24
Cohen, supra note 22.
25
Cohen, supra note 22.
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including Osama Bin Laden, the head of Al Qaeda.26 In 1993, a year
after Bin Laden moved to Sudan, Al Qaeda committed its first attack
against the World Trade Center in New York City, killing six people
with a truck bomb.27 The Clinton Administration designated Sudan
as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and the country became subject to
sanctions, diplomatic withdrawals, and UN condemnation.28 Under
pressure, Sudan eventually expelled Osama Bin Laden to
Afghanistan, but even after Bin Laden was expelled, Sudan was
implicated in Al Qaeda’s 1998 bombings of the US Embassies in
Tanzania and Kenya and Al Qaeda’s 2000 bombing of the USS Cole
naval ship off the coast of Yemen.29 The Bashir regime’s connection
to Al Qaeda’s attacks furthered its international isolation in the early
twenty-first century as did its oppression of its own people,
particularly in Darfur.
b. Darfur Rebellion
Bashir’s Arabization and Islamization campaign manifested in
the systemic oppression of non-Arab and non-Muslim Sudanese
throughout the country. Various non-Arab groups in Darfur rose
up in three rebellions against the Bashir regime. The first Darfuri
rebellion was the short Arab-Fur conflict of 1991, and the second
Darfuri rebellion was the Arab-Masalit conflict, which lasted from
1995-99.30 The third Darfuri rebellion of 2003–2010 was the largest
civil conflict in Darfur in more than a century and it was led by a
coalition of the largest and most powerful African tribes in Darfur—
the Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa.31 Some have argued that the
Bashir regime increased its attacks in the oil-rich Darfur region to
increase its access to oil, as the oil-rich South moved towards greater

26
See Cohen, supra note 22; see also Hamza Hendawi, Sudan under al-Bashir:
Long history of turmoil, conflicts, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 3, 2019),
https://apnews.com/article/8c637e57658243aca3ee36318a6b5e20
[https://perma.cc/C3Q6-9EBP].
27
Cohen, supra note 22; Sarah Pruitt, 7 Facts About the 1993 World Trade Center
Bombing, HISTORY (Aug. 24, 2021), https://www.history.com/news/world-tradecenter-bombing-1993-facts [https://perma.cc/586Z-77CD].
28
Cohen, supra note 22.
29
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 102-03, 113-14.
30
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 128-31.
31
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 135.
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independence following the North-South peace negotiations of the
early 2000s.32
The third rebellion was fomented by the publication of The Black
Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan (“The Black Book”),33 a
heavily researched and detailed book about the ethnic and
geographic origin of the Sudanese elite who had ruled Sudan since
independence.34 The Black Book revealed that most of the country
outside of the Sudanese elites’ stronghold in Khartoum and the
northeast had been marginalized.35 The Black Book was produced by
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a Darfur rebel group run
by the Zaghawa, an African tribe that later allied with the Fur and
Masalit in rebellion against Khartoum.36 In May 2000, JEM arranged
to have copies of The Black Book distributed outside mosques, in cities
throughout Sudan as people left Friday prayers. 37 The Black Book
spread quickly throughout Sudan, and within Darfur, it inflamed
the existing grievances of African tribes, setting off the Third
Rebellion against the Bashir regime.38
The Black Book revealed that the Three Tribes of the northern Nile
River Valley—the Shaiqiyya, Ja’aliyiin, and Danagla—which made
up only 5.4 percent of the Sudanese population, completely
dominated Sudanese institutions by holding seventy percent or
more of its senior positions, concentrating the nation’s resources and
oil revenue in Khartoum and the so-called Arab Triangle. 39 The
Arab Triangle is a geographic region in northeastern Sudan that is
the stronghold of the Three Tribes and includes the capital,
Khartoum.40 Members of the Three Tribes self-identify with Arab
culture and identity, and this identity undergirded the Bashir
regime’s desire to turn Sudan into an Islamic state dominated by
Arab-identified people through its forced Arabization and
See Michael J. Kelly, The Debate over Genocide in Darfur, Sudan, 18 U.C. DAVIS
J. INT’L L & POL’Y 205, 208-9 (2011).
33 THE BLACK BOOK: IMBALANCE OF POWER AND WEALTH IN SUDAN (Abdullahi
Osman
El-Tom
trans.,
2004),
https://www.sudanjem.com/sudanalt/english/books/blackbook_part1/book_part1.asp.htm
[https://perma.cc/U7WY-6YPU].
34
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 132.
35
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 132; see also Kritz & Wilson, supra note 15, at 478.
36
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 132.
37
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 132-33.
38
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 135.
39
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 132.
40
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 9-10.
32
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Islamization campaigns.41 This strategy of forced Arabization and
Islamization alienated the fifty-five percent of historic Sudanese that
identified as African and the third of the country that was nonMuslim. 42 Prior to the 2011 partition of Sudan, Arab-identified
people were the minority of the population, representing forty-five
percent of the country. After the partition, discussed herein, the
percent of the country that was Arab became fifty-five percent. 43
And it was an even smaller minority of the self-identified Arab
population—the Three Tribes—that truly controlled the levers of
power in Sudan.44
The detailed revelations of The Black Book galvanized the Darfuri
Fur, Masalit, and Zhargawa to form a military alliance against
Bashir driven by their shared experiences of marginalization,
poverty, underdevelopment, and human rights victimization by
Arab supremacists. 45 In 2001, Fur and Zhagawa leaders signed a
pledge to resist the Arab supremacy movement sweeping across
Darfur. In February 2002, they initiated their first joint military
campaign against Bashir’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). 46 The
Masalit joined the alliance soon thereafter and in response, Bashir
mobilized new units of the Janjawiid militia, an Arab militia group
drawn from violent Arab supremacist groups such as the Arab
Gathering and the Islamic Legion. 47 The Janjawiid entered each
village in Dar Masalit of Western Darfur and summarily executed
nearly 2000 local Masalit leaders and sheiks in front of their tribes.48
Janjawiid attacks against Fur villages increased, with the Janjawiid
destroying hundreds of Fur villages, raping women and killing
young men.49
The following year, “in February 2003, the Darfur rebel coalition
formally announced its intention to rebel.”50 Between February and
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 11-12.
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 12.
43
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 12.
44
THE BLACK BOOK: IMBALANCE OF POWER AND WEALTH IN SUDAN, supra note
33 (see discussion following Table 10 noting that the Shaiqiyya, Ja’aliyiin, and
Danagla were a small minority that dominated political control for the rest of the
country).
45
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 135.
46
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 137.
47
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 125, 137; see also Kritz & Wilson, supra note 15, at
479.
48
NATSIOS., supra note 11, at 137.
49
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 137.
50
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 138.
41
42
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October 2003, the rebels inflicted the most damage on the SAF since
Sudan’s independence; the rebels won thirty-four out of thirty-eight
battles with the SAF.51 These defeats led Bashir to impose a brutal
counterinsurgency campaign against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa
alliance. 52 To bolster the counterinsurgency campaign, Bashir
offered a dar—or homeland—to his newly appointed Janjawiid
commander Sheikh Moussa Hillal and his Um Jalal clan in exchange
for their recruitment of new Janjawiid troops.53 Dar are culturally
significant and tied to social capital, “for generations, Darfuri tribes
were assigned their own specific “dar” or land for their farmers and
herders.” 54 Many of the smaller Arab tribes in the North were
nomadic and had not been assigned a dar.55 Population increase,
animal heard expansion, climatic changes, and a decrease in arable
land caused some of these tribes to believe that they were at risk of
extinction.56 Therefore, Bashir’s offer of a dar to Hillal and his clan
was a powerful incentive for their recruitment of new Janjawiid,
who engaged in oppressive campaigns against the tribal coalition in
Darfur, in part, to eliminate them from land that they wanted for
their promised dar.57
The Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa coalition attacks against SAF
bases, police stations, and government buildings were increasingly
successful and, in retaliation, Bashir decided not only to pursue the
rebels, but also to attack their defenseless civilian villages in
retaliation. 58 Bashir’s campaign against the Darfur rebellion
targeted the coalition’s villages mercilessly and committed systemic,
grave human rights violations.59 A repetitive pattern for the attacks
included SAF air force carpet bombings of civilian villages, followed
by Janjawiid troops attacking the villages from trucks and on
horseback.60 The Janjawiid would enter the bombed villages, kill
any males that could potentially be recruited for the rebellion, bury
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 139.
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 139.
53
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 139-40.
54
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 125.
55
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 125.
56
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 125-26.
57
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 139-40 (stating that that the dar could only be
given to Hillal at the expense of another tribe and that Hillal’s clan would be
expected to recruit Janjawiid troop in return for the dar).
58
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 140.
59
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 148-9
60
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 148.
51
52
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them in mass graves, and then “rape village women to humiliate
their fathers and husbands . . . forced to watch helplessly at
gunpoint.”61 The Janjawiid troops would then loot the communities
and burn crops before leaving the villages. 62 Bashir’s campaign
against the coalition rebels constituted an ethnic cleansing
campaign, as 1.8 million Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa and other
sympathetic tribe members were forced from their land into sixtyfive Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps located throughout
Darfur and 240,000 Sudanese were forced into refugee camps in
Chad.63
Estimates of the number of deaths in Darfur committed during
Bashir’s campaign have greatly varied. The Center for Research on
the Epidemiology of Disasters at the Université Catholique de
Louvain La Neuve, Belgium (“Louvain Study”) estimated that there
were 298,000 deaths in Darfur during the entire conflict from 200310. 64 The Louvain Study concluded that approximately eighty
percent of the deaths were from disease and malnutrition caused by
the forced displacement, and that twenty percent, or 60,000 deaths,
were due to the violent conflict. 65 Other international advocacy
groups placed the numbers at much higher levels—Eric Reeves, a
Smith College professor and advocate, estimated that “544,000
people died—304,000 from violence and 240,000 from the disease,
dehydration, and hunger caused by [the] forced displacement.” 66
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell commissioned a report by the
International Coalition for Justice on the scope of the atrocities in
Darfur.67 This coalition of US judges, prosecutors, and detectives
conducted over 1,000 interviews with Darfuri refugees in Chad.
Based on the report’s findings, Secretary Powell reported to
Congress on September 9, 2004, and later to the United Nations, that

NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 148.
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 148.
63
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 148-49 (describing how the government’s
strategy was an ethnic cleansing that purged and displaced certain groups).
64
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 153 (describing the study and reporting it had
a mid-range average of 298,000 deaths).
65
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 153.
66
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 151 (noting that Reeves’ estimates were drawn
from “extrapolating from the number of original family members reported by
Darfuri refugees in Chad, a method not accepted by international public health
experts or demographers who are technical experts in the discipline of mortality
rates.”).
67
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 150.
61
62
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genocide was occurring in Sudan.68 The definition of genocide, as
contained in the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, is the commission of certain
acts “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group.”69 The acts include killing, causing serious
bodily or mental harm, preventing births, forcibly transferring
children, or deliberately inflicting conditions intended to bring
about the destruction of the group.70
The mass human rights atrocities in Sudan led the United
Nations Security Council to request an International Criminal Court
(ICC) investigation of the situation in Darfur in 2005. 71 Despite
concerns expressed by some human rights advocates that an
indictment would thwart peace negotiations, 72 in July 2008, ICC
Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo ordered the arrest of Bashir
and two members of his regime for the commission of crimes against
humanity in Darfur.73 In 2009, “the ICC affirmed the order, and in
July 2010 . . . added an indictment for genocide.”74
c. The North-South Civil Wars and Secession
The Third Darfur Rebellion, which led to Bashir’s indictment by
the ICC for crimes against humanity and genocide, was neither the
first nor the longest-standing conflict between the Bashir regime and
Sudanese citizens outside the so-called Arab Triangle. This
distinction was held by the citizens of southern Sudan who had
fought two long-standing civil wars with Khartoum.75 The seeds of
the North-South civil wars began before Sudan obtained its

68
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 157 (describing Secretary Powell as reporting
genocide was occurring in Darfur).
69
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
art. II, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
70
Id.
71
S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1 (Mar. 31, 2005).
72
See, e.g., Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, ‘This prosecution will endanger the people
(July
12,
2008);
we
wish
to
defend
in
Sudan’,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/13/sudan.humanrights
[https://perma.cc/24KP-94AJ].
73
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 160.
74
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 160.
75
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 12-13.
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independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956.76 In 1821, an Ottoman
Turk-Egyptian army invaded and took military control of the
territory that comprised the historic Fur sultanate, Funj sultanate,
Azande Kingdom, and Shilluk kingdom, which makes up the
modern states of Sudan and South Sudan. 77 The Turco-Egyptian
Administration imposed a heavy annual toll on the African tribes of
the south.78 The Turco-Egyptian Administration kidnapped up to
30,000 non-Muslim Africans from the South into slavery on an
annual basis to populate their enslaved army. 79 During the
nineteenth century, this slave trade virtually depopulated regions of
the South.80 This legacy influenced Southern African tribes’ fear of
continued oppression following independence.81
Following World War II, in 1950, Egypt’s King Farouk
announced to his parliament that he was abrogating “the 1899
Condominium Agreement with Great Britain and the 1936 AngloEgyptian Treaty, which had established a joint British-Egyptian
claim on Sudanese territory.”82 King Farouk announced that Sudan
would be annexed to Egypt under his monarchy and he approved a
constitution that purported to unify the two countries, although he
had no communication with either northern or southern leaders in
Sudan. 83 Two years later, in 1952, King Farouk was deposed by
Abdel Nasser. 84 The new Egyptian secular socialist regime
abandoned Egyptian claims to Sudan and supported Sudan’s
independence from Great Britain.85
At a 1947 conference in Juba, representatives from the north of
Sudan and a group of representatives from the South, who did not
represent popular southern opinion, agreed to a Khartoum

NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 12-13.
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 16 (describing the geographical territory
occupied by the four political powers and the arrival of the Egyptian army).
78
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 18
79
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 18.
80
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 18 (describing the amount of people taken
captive and how the scale of the practice exceeded what had occurred in the region
under the Funj Kingdom).
81
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 18.
82
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 36-37.
83
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 37.
84
See generally NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 37 (describing how a colonel named
Nasser and General Muhammad Naguib unseat Farouk)
85
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 39.
76
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supported plan to create a National Assembly for all of Sudan.86 In
1953, elections were held throughout Sudan and a National
Assembly was elected to prepare for decolonization. 87 This new
coalition “voted against [a] union with Egypt following
independence” from Britain.88 Sudan’s Southern leaders organized
a second Juba conference in 1954 that agreed with the National
Assembly’s vote for independence from Egypt, but only if the
southern region would be given autonomy within a federal state, or
was guaranteed self-determination, including through an
independent southern state if necessary.89
The denial of southern leaders’ demands for autonomy and selfdetermination following independence from Britain and Egypt in
1956 led to the two North-South civil wars—the first from 1956-1972
and the second from 1983-2005.90 The half century of North-South
conflicts led to the loss of 4,000,000 lives before the conclusion of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 between Khartoum and
the South.91
When Bashir came to power in 1989, the second North-South
Civil conflict had been underway for six years.92 It started in 1983
when Khartoum violated the 1972 Addis-Ababa Peace Agreement
that had ended the first North-South conflict.93 The Addis-Ababa
Agreement created a federal state in southern Sudan with its own
regional parliament and Council of Ministers. 94 The Agreement
specified English as the official language of instruction in schools in
the new southern state. 95 The catalyst for the second civil war
occurred in January 1983, when Khartoum attempted to re-deploy
southern army units to the North, which, under the Addis-Ababa
Agreement, were to remain in the Southern region to defend it.96
86
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 38-39 (describing who was present at the
conference and its purposes).
87
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 39.
88
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 39.
89
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 40.
90
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 12-13 (describing the reasons behind the civil
wars)
91
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 40 (describing the toll the war would exact
before the South gained its independence).
92
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 60-1 and 80 (discussing the start of the Second
Civil War in 1983 and Bashir’s taking of power in 1989).
93
See discussion infra Part IV.
94
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 50.
95
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 50.
96
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 65-66.
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The southern army units militarily resisted re-deployment, leading
to a military conflict with the SAF and the start of the second civil
war.97 In all, “3,000 southern troops deserted the SAF and joined the
civil war . . . .”98 In July 1983, John Garang, one of the leaders of the
southern armed forces, consolidated the southern troops as the
unified Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and created the
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), both under his
leadership.99
Over the course of the year, Sudanese President Numayri took
additional measures that abrogated the Addis-Ababa Agreement
and escalated the civil war. In June 1983, Sudanese President
Numayri issued Republican Order Number One, which dissolved
the Southern Regional Assembly and divided the Southern region
into three separate provinces with three separate capitals and three
weaker provincial assemblies that lacked fiscal authority. 100
Numayri’s order also rescinded the South’s power to elect its own
Governors and granted himself the authority to appoint
Governors.101 He also eliminated separate southern army units and
the proportional representation of southerners in the Sudanese
Armed Forces for which the Addis Ababa Agreement provided.102
Further, the order “substituted Arabic for English as the official
language.”103 Following Order Number One, Khartoum imposed
the September Laws, which imposed Sharia law throughout all of
Sudan.104 The government began to impose harsh penalties such as
floggings, cross-amputations, and public executions by stoning.105
All these actions by Khartoum fueled the second revolution.
After John Garang announced himself the commander-in-chief of
the SPLA and its civilian counterpart, the Southern Manifesto was
published, which detailed the weaknesses of the Addis Ababa
Agreement and the federal Southern government that was created
out of it. 106 By the end of 1985, John Garang, with 10,000 troops
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 65-66.
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 66.
99
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 66.
100
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 60.
101
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 60.
102
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 60.
103
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 60.
104
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 60-61.
105
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 61 (describing news reports of the
punishments).
106
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 66.
97
98
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under his command in Sudan, and 20,000 troops in training in
nearby Ethiopia, had taken control of most of the south. 107 In
response to protests against Numayri brought on by the collapsing
economy, the SAF toppled him and announced a plan for national
elections within a year.108 Al-Mahdi’s party won the election and
Sadiq al-Mahdi became Prime Minister.109 He imposed a four point
plan that continued Khartoum’s historic policies of Arabization and
Islamization in the South.110 Ultimately, al-Mahdi was deposed in
1989 by Bashir, who continued the civil war with the South.111
Bashir drastically exacerbated the Second Civil War. The Second
Civil War between Sudan and South Sudan involved countless
atrocities, including combatants killed over battles for oil, religious
massacres, and mass torture.112 In addition, government forces and
allied militias are estimated to have used 17,000 children as
combatants in the conflict and the opposition armed groups are
estimated to have used 2,500 to 5,000 child soldiers. 113 Bashir’s
government instructed certain northern militia groups to mass
slaughter southern villages in ethnic cleansings.114 These northern
militia groups also raped and abducted thousands of women and

107
See generally NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 66 (describing the number of troops
within the SPLA).
108
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 71.
109
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 71-72 (describing how the Umma Party, led
by Sadiq al-Mahdi, won the most seats in the National Assembly and took office).
110
See NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 72 (describing the policies and how they
sought to encourage Arabization and Islamization among the Southern
population).
111
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 80.
112
See World Peace Found., Sudan: 1985—2005, MASS ATROCITY ENDINGS,
(Aug. 7, 2015), https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/sudan-2ndcivil-war-darfur/ [https://perma.cc/M5CU-GU9J] (examining the numerous acts
of violence that occurred in Sudan in the 1990s such as the Government’s jihad and
massacres on oilfields).
113
CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L, CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL REPORT 2004—SUDAN (2004),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4988062928.html
[https://perma.cc/A8EV7P7P].
114
Facts & Stats, Sudan: The Quick and the Terrible, January 2005, PBS
FRONTLINE/WORLD.
(Jan.
2005),
https://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/sudan/facts.html
[https://perma.cc/G8VC-VCAZ].
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children from southern villages for servitude.115 Within the south,
civilians also experienced intra-ethnic violence.116
Over its twenty-two-year period, the Second Civil War placed
about 2.6 million people at risk for starvation. 117 Bashir’s
government, militias, and smaller faction groups precipitated
famine in South Sudan and other areas by deliberately blocking food
and medical relief supplies.118 As a result, a rough estimate of one
to two million civilians died due to starvation and disease in the
war.119 Further, the conflict displaced more than 4.5 million civilians
as refugees, most of them from the south.120
In addition to escalating the war with the south, Bashir’s
government established a penal code that instituted amputations,
torture, mass arrests, and other stringent punishments for anyone
who opposed his extreme Islamist views or created outside political
parties.121
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, neighboring countries were
pushing for peace within Sudan, particularly Kenya, Ethiopia,
Eritrea, and Uganda under the confederation of the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development. 122 Oil companies
halted business relations with Sudan due to their inability to
conduct business in a war free environment. The United States also
pressured Sudan to change its policies and to pursue peace by

World Peace Found., supra note 112.
See Jok Madut Jok & Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, Sudan’s Prolonged Second
Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities, 42 AFR. STUD. REV.
125, 127, 137-39 (1999) (describing the intra-ethnic violence that occurred between
groups in South Sudan and the origins of these conflicts).
117
Leben Nelson Moro, Oil, War and Forced Migration in Sudan, 2 ST.
ANTHONY’S INT’L REV. 75, 81 (2006).
118
Id.
119
See World Peace Found., supra note 112 (“[T]he conflict was marked by
violence against civilians, which caused the deaths of a rough estimates of 1 – 2
million civilians, many of them a result of starvation and disease.”).
120
CHILD SOLDIERS INT’L, supra note 109.
121
Greg Larson, A brief history of modern Sudan and South Sudan, WATER FOR
SOUTH SUDAN (2020), https://www.waterforsouthsudan.org/brief-history-ofsouth-sudan [https://perma.cc/QAL4-VVYJ] (stating, “the new government
fiercely enforce[d] Islamic code throughout Sudan, banning . . . political parties.”).
See Salman, infra note 248, at 371-72 (stating the government amended the 1973
constitution and introduced harsh penalties like amputating the hands of people
convicted of petty theft) and at 376 (discussing the regime’s mass arrests, torture
and banning of political parties.).
122
Larson, supra note 121.
115
116
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imposing sanctions that prohibited trade with businesses in Sudan
and investment in Sudan.123
The second civil war formally came to an end with the
conclusion of the Comprehensive Agreement of 2005 between
Khartoum and the SPLM.124 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement
included provisions allowing for secession, which South Sudan
exercised in 2011, becoming an independent state.125
d. 2019 Popular Revolution
Despite South Sudan’s secession, Sudan continued to experience
significant conflict and disarray under Bashir. Ultimately Bashir’s
repression and policies led to a popular revolution that toppled him
in 2019. 126 Much like the Arab Spring revolutions that erupted
throughout the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, Sudanese
citizens took to the streets in protest “because of long-standing
economic and political grievances and anger over state corruption
and abuse.” 127 Professional associations, unions, and opposition
parties organized protests and strikes in the southeastern cities of
Damazin and Sennar on December 13, 2018, over increasing food
costs and fuel, medicine and cash shortages.128 Bashir had tanked
the economy by gross mismanagement and corruption, spending
seventy percent of the national budget on security forces used to
oppress his political opposition.129 The loss of oil revenue due to
South Sudan’s secession and continuing U.S. sanctions also

Facts & Stats, Sudan: The Quick and the Terrible, January 2005, supra note 114.
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 180 (“The CPA…was a political agreement that
ended an increasingly unpopular war.”).
125
NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 171.
126
INT’L CRISIS GRP., SAFEGUARDING SUDAN’S REVOLUTION 6 (2019),
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/281-safeguarding-sudansrevolution_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS92-2CKC].
127
Darin E.W. Johnson, Beyond Constituent Assemblies and Referenda: Assessing
the Legitimacy of the Arab Spring Constitutions in Egypt and Tunisia, 50 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2015).
128
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 3.
129
See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 3 (“Bashir had maintained his power
by repressing political opposition, fighting costly counter-insurgencies in
peripheral areas and underwriting his factious security sector with patronagedriven expenditures that ate up, by some estimates, seventy per cent of the national
budget.”).
123
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negatively impacted the economy.130 The protests spread to other
cities and by December 19, protesters were calling for regime
change.131
Bashir had previously used his security forces to put down
middle-class youth-led protests in Khartoum, but these protests
arising outside Khartoum had a broader base of support and were
organized by neighborhood resistance committees that had learned
from prior protests how to resist Bashir’s armed response. 132 On
January 1, 2019, the Sudan Professionals Association joined with
twenty-one other groups to form the Forces for Freedom and
Change opposition group, which called for a national transition
government to replace Bashir.133 Bashir responded by declaring a
state of emergency and installing military officers as governors in
Sudan’s eighteen states.134 Bashir formed a security committee of
loyalists to attempt to manage the protests.135 By April, state funds
were depleted from covering police and security official overtime in
response to four months of protests.136 National inflation shot up to
seventy percent, further impacting the Sudanese citizenry. 137
Protesters sensed Bashir’s vulnerability and called for widespread
street protests.138 On April 6, protesters organized sit-ins at police
headquarters in Khartoum and at military installations in a number
of other cities. 139 After protesters camped outside the military
installations, on April 10, Bashir’s security committee decided to
topple Bashir.140 Following the coup, the military leadership sought
to assert political control of Sudan, but following the military’s
massacre of 120 protesters, the international community backed the
protesters demand for a transition to civilian rule.141 The military
130
See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 3 (stating that protests spread to
another city, Atbara, by this time and protesters were demanding regime change).
131
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 3.
132
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 3.
133
See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 4 (describing the formation of the
SPA and its goals).
134
See INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 4 (describing the government’s
response to the protests).
135
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 5.
136
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 5.
137
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 5.
138
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 5.
139
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 5.
140
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 6.
141
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 7-9.
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leadership caved to this domestic and international pressure, and
negotiated a power-sharing arrangement with the civilian coalition
to form a joint transitional government and which outlined a thirtynine-month roadmap to democratic elections, which was reflected
in the August 17 Constitutional Declaration. 142 This transitional
government, comprised members of the Forces For Freedom and
Change civilian protest movement,as well as military members of
Bashir’s former regime.143
III. THE PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE DEBATE
From the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement to the 2020 Juba
Agreement, peace agreements have played a central role in
mediating the longstanding regional, racial, and religious conflicts
in Sudan.144 Peace scholars have long debated the question of peace
versus justice.145 The debate centers around the issue of whether
parties to a peace process, some of whom may have been engaged
in the commission of international crimes, would agree to negotiate
peace if there is the potential that they themselves would
subsequently be subjected to justice through criminal
accountability.146
Historically, amnesty played a central role in many twentieth
century peace agreements and was often seen as a necessary tradeoff for peace. For example, Turkish forces, who many considered
responsible for the massacre of eight hundred thousand to one
million Armenians147 during World War I, were given amnesty in
the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. 148 In another instance of impunity,
French and Algerians soldiers who massacred thousands of civilians
during the Algerian War were given amnesty under the Evian
142
143
144
145

2006).

INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 126, at 8-9.
Marsden, supra note 5.
See discussion infra Section IV.
See generally Richard J. Goldstone, Peace versus Justice, 6 NEV. L.J. 421 (2005-
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Geoffrey Robertson, Was There An Armenian Genocide?, 4 UNIV. OF ST.
THOMAS J. OF L. AND PUB. POLICY 83, 100 (2010) (describing the number of Armenians
massacred).
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ch.
VIII,
July
24,
1923,
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Agreement of 1962. 149 During the 1980s, in Argentina, Chile, El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Uruguay, former regime officials who
had engaged in widespread atrocity crimes against thousands of
their citizens, including torture and killing by death squads, were
given amnesty as part of the political transition to new
governments.150 These blanket amnesties contributed to an initial
peace but in many instances, it was not a durable peace. Often
amnesty resulted in perpetrators returning to positions of power
and re-committing atrocities, or the amnesties fed lingering societal
resentments that led to a lack of social cohesion and recurrence of
the conflict. For example, a century after the Armenian genocide,
many in the Armenian community are still seeking a form of
acknowledgement or reparations related to the massacre by Turkish
forces during WWI.151 Regarding recurrence, many of the Algerian
combatants receiving amnesty during the Algerian War were
involved in committing similar atrocities in the Algerian Civil
War.152
A move away from blanket amnesty in exchange for peace began
to occur in the late twentieth century, as hybrid international
criminal tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia were established,153
and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was
completed.154 These new institutions reflected growing consensus
within the international legal community that accountability
following conflict is an integral part of long-term peace in post
conflict environments.155 The peace versus justice dilemma evolved
into a general consensus that transitional justice arrangements
should provide for both peace and justice.156 Despite this general
consensus, peace versus justice tradeoffs continue to abound.
149
Paul Williams, Lawyering Peace: Infusing Accountability into the Peace
Negotiations Process, 52 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 491, 494 (2020).
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 499-502 (discussing the creation of the Rwanda and Yugoslavia
Tribunals and the ICC).
154
Juan Menendez, Keynote Address at the McCulloch Ctr. For Glob.
Initiatives, Justice and Imagination: Building Peace in Post-Conflict Societies
Conference, Justice or Peace? Can We Have Both? 4 (Feb. 1–Mar. 1, 2014)
(discussing the emergence and importance of the Peace with Justice framework),
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/sites/default/files/global/docs/Keynote.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6FR-9TJ9].
155
Williams, supra note 149, at 498.
156
Williams, supra note 149, at 498.
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Different frameworks that transitional justice scholars and
practitioners have developed to explore the ongoing peace versus
justice debate include “Peace First,” “Justice First,” and “Peace with
Justice.” This section explores each in turn.
a. Peace First Approach
The first theoretical framework in the Peace versus Justice
dilemma is referred to as the Peace First approach. The Peace First
approach prioritizes peace over accountability and other interests,
and is singularly focused on achieving an end to a conflict through
a negotiated peace to save lives as quickly as possible.157 Under this
view, scholars have noted that
[t]he singular role of [peace] negotiators is to seek an
agreement that brings the most immediate end to the
violence. All other goals and concerns that may impede
immediate peace should be pushed aside. In this way, the
approach is single-minded and pragmatic: peace is the
priority and any obstacle to peace should be avoided or
eliminated.158
Advocates of the Peace First approach generally assert that
accountability should not be pursued immediately if doing so
would prolong the immediate conflict.159 Within a peace process,
negotiating parties who have committed atrocities are often seen as
advocates for a Peace First approach, as they hope to avoid
accountability for their crimes. 160 A Peace First approach is also
associated with mediators who may believe their “role is to end the
conflict, not to assume the role of a prosecutor and assign
responsibility or call for justice.”161 As such, Peace First approach
mediators may end up accommodating the interest of atrocity
perpetrators in evading responsibility by initially deemphasizing
157
Paul R. Williams, Lisa K. Dicker, and C. Danae Paterson, The Peace vs.
Justice Puzzle and the Syrian Crisis, 24 ILSA J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 417, 421 (2018).
158
See id. (describing the theories underpinning the Peace First approach and
how one the most salient priorities under this approach is ending the violence).
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
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accountability. A Peace First approach can be reflected in
agreements exclusively focused on ending violent conflict such as
Ceasefires and Cessation of Hostilities agreements. This approach
might also require peacekeeping and international engagement to
enforce the peace. Amnesty agreements can also be seen as
reflecting a Peace First approach. Advocates of a Peace First
approach would say that its benefits include saving lives as quickly
as possible and ending the destructive harm that violence brings.
An example of a Peace First approach would be the Arab Spring
conflict in Yemen that arose in 2011.162 The Government security
forces responded to a Yemeni student uprising with violence that
led 250 deaths, 1,000 injuries, and 100,000 displacements in ten
months. 163 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stepped in and
negotiated an end to hostilities and a peace agreement that gave
Yemeni President Saleh immunity from prosecution for any crimes
that he committed during his thirty five year tenure, as long as he
stepped down and transferred power to his Vice President.164 The
GCC-mediated resolution involving Saleh reflects the overall
benefits and drawbacks to a Peace First approach—although Saleh’s
departure and amnesty agreement may have ended the early phase
of the conflict in Yemen, the agreement ultimately allowed Saleh to
retain his freedom and political influence. He later returned to
Yemen to work with the armed Houthi secessionist movement that
devolved the country into a protracted civil war.165
b. Justice First Approach
The second theoretical framework is known as a Justice First
approach. In a peace process, a Justice First approach prioritizes
justice through accountability measures such as prosecution.166 A
162
See Darin E.W. Johnson, Conflict Constitution-Making in Libya and Yemen, 39
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 293, 321-22 (2017) [hereinafter Conflict Constitution-Making]
(discussing how Yemen President Saleh was provided amnesty for some human
rights violations to leave office with the goal of quelling the Arab Spring conflict).
163
Id. at 321.
164
Id.
165
Shuaib Almosawa and Ben Hubbard, Yemen’s Ex-President Killed as Mayhem
TIMES
(Dec.
4,
2017)
Convulses
Capital,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/world/middleeast/saleh-yemenhouthis.html [https://perma.cc/C7RA-3EFP].
166
Williams, supra note 149, at 430.
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Justice First approach might tolerate a prolonged peace process so
long as prosecution for atrocity crimes is part of any negotiated
settlement. 167 As noted by peace process scholars: “[a]lthough
insisting upon accountability mechanisms may prolong the conflict,
the eventual peace that is created is more likely to be sustainable.”168
Parties to a conflict whose members have been the primary victims
of atrocity crimes and individual victims of atrocity crimes are often
seen as proponents of a Justice First approach.169 External entities
such as states that have ratified the ICC Statute and international
institutions, such as the ICC, are seen as advocates of a Justice First
approach.170 Further, international non-government organizations
(NGOs) that are dedicated to pursuing justice for international
crimes through prosecutions are advocates of a Justice First
approach.171
In order to incorporate a Justice First approach, peace scholars
have noted that
the peace process [must be] inclusive of the interests of all
key stakeholders, not just the armed combatants. While the
armed actors are less likely to seek the inclusion of an
accountability
mechanism,
civil
society,
victims,
marginalized populations, and other groups who were
harmed during the conflict and did not, themselves, commit
atrocities are likely to seek justice.172
The benefits to a Justice First approach are that it avoids the
assignment of collective guilt to an entire population by holding
specific perpetrators accountable, delegitimizes oppressive
institutions and war criminals, and facilitates victim catharsis.173 In
its ideal manifestation, a Justice First approach contributes to nonrecurrence, promotes deterrence, and supports an accurate
historical record.174

Williams, supra note 149, at 430.
Williams, supra note 149, at 430-31.
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See Williams, supra note 149, at 431 (describing how many NGOs seek to
promote justice for crimes and many prepare for future justice mechanisms).
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The mechanisms that are used in a Just First approach are the
ICC, ad hoc international criminal tribunals, hybrid tribunals,
specialized domestic courts, universal jurisdiction, and the
prohibition of any form of amnesty that violates international law.175
For example, the ICC has prioritized justice by initiating
investigations of its own volition or at the request of states while
parties are in the midst of negotiating peace. 176 In one example,
while the Ugandan government was engaged in peace negotiations
with the Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”), the ICC issued arrest
warrants against LRA leader Joseph Kony after the matter was
referred to it by the Ugandan government.177 Accordingly, the draft
comprehensive agreement that resulted from the peace negotiations
heavily emphasized justice and called for a special Ugandan court
to prosecute LRA leaders.178 Kony refused to sign the agreement,
but the draft agreement language led Uganda to establish an
international crimes division within its court system to complement
the ICC.179 While the ICC indictment led to Kony’s refusal to sign
the peace agreement,180 the prioritization of justice by the ICC and
the Ugandan government resulted in the ICC’s recent conviction of
one of Kony’s closest LRA allies.181
As seen with Kony’s refusal to sign the Ugandan-LRA peace
deal, some observers have argued that a Justice First approach can
undermine peace processes.
In the Sudan context, some
peacemakers, including former U.S. Envoy to Sudan Andrew
Natsios, argued that the ICC’s 2008 issuance of an arrest warrant for
Bashir’s international crimes in Darfur would undermine the peace
process with Darfur and the regime’s implementation of the 2005
North-South peace accord.182 However, following Bashir’s toppling
Williams, supra note 149, at 434.
Williams, supra note 149, at 442.
177
Williams, supra note 149, at 442.
178
Williams, supra note 149, at 442.
179
Williams, supra note 149, at 442.
180
Skye Wheeler, Ugandan rebel Kony still refuses to sign peace deal, REUTERS
(Nov. 30, 2008, 1:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSWAL063121
[https://perma.cc/2DET-XTXS].
181
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(May
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by the 2019 revolution, observers have argued that Bashir’s
prosecution by the ICC will further the cause of peace 183 and the
Sudanese transition government has publicly stated that it will turn
Bashir over to the ICC.184
c. Peace with Justice
Peace with Justice is an emerging framework that argues that
peace and justice are mutually enforcing rather than mutually
exclusive and that both objectives can and should be pursued
concurrently.185
The Peace First approach acknowledges that the pursuit of
justice can impact the pursuit of peace.186 The Justice First approach
prioritizes justice from the perspective that sustainable peace is
impossible without accountability. 187 The Peace with Justice
approach advances the idea that peace and justice are not mutually
exclusive and should be pursued together in measured intentional
ways.188 The question becomes not which goal to pursue first, but
rather how to pursue both. The primary tenets of the Peace with
Justice approach can be summarized as:
1) peace and justice are inextricably connected to both
reinforce and complement one another; 2) the promotion of
both, regardless of how complex and difficult, should be
pursued; 3) there is a grave need for peace, but it should be
found in conjunction with recognition of the demand for

https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSMCD424646
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183
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185
Menendez, supra note 154 (discussing the emergence and importance of the
Peace with Justice framework).
186
Williams, supra note 149, at 443.
187
Williams, supra note 149, at 443.
188
Williams, supra note 149, at 443.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

214

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 43:1

justice; and 4) when mishandled, peace and justice may
clash, but peace should never justify impunity.189
Peace with Justice advocates observe that by combining peace
with justice during a peace process, the form of justice pursued
naturally shifts from retributive to restorative, because participants
in a post-conflict peace process may see restorative justice as an
effective tool for reconciliation.190
Restorative justice principles focus on reconciling the
wrongdoer with the victim through participatory processes that
acknowledge wrong-doing and seek reparation and healing. 191
These principles have informed transitional justice mechanisms
such as truth and reconciliation processes. 192 Additional nonprosecutorial restorative justice measures in transitional contexts
include localized traditional justice measures, memorialization,
reparations, and institutional reform.193
The long-term peace envisioned by Peace with Justice relies
upon the strategic sequencing and phasing of various transitional
justice mechanisms that embody restorative justice values. 194
Strategic sequencing anticipates that parties will seek justice
following the completion of a peace agreement, so justice and peace
are not prioritized over one another in separate processes, but rather
carefully planned together as part of a long term process.195 Some
critics argue that the long term nature of sequenced justice processes
will not satisfy victims of international crimes.196 Of course, justice
processes under any framework necessarily are long term in nature.
The transitional justice process in Sierra Leone can be described
as reflecting a Peace with Justice approach. The Sierra Leonean
peace process was interwoven with retributive and restorative
justice mechanisms. Initially, the 1999 Lome Peace Agreement
provided amnesty for parties who committed certain crimes under
Sierra Leonean law and in 2000 a Truth and Reconciliation
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Commission was created.197 However, two years later, the United
Nations Security Council accepted the Sierra Leonean government’s
request to establish the hybrid Special Court for Sierra Leone to
prosecute international and domestic crimes committed during the
conflict. 198 Despite the fact that the inclusion of certain amnesty
provisions may have been necessary to get the parties to sign the
peace agreement, the sequencing of justice through the Sierra
Leonean government’s subsequent request for a hybrid UN
international court ensured a form of accountability. The United
Nations determined that the Special Court was not bound by the
amnesty provisions in the Lome Agreement relative to international
crimes, which enabled the Special Court to prosecute several high
level perpetrators of the conflict, including Liberian President
Charles Taylor.199
As seen in the Sierra Leone context, Peace with Justice may
involve coordination across multiple parties and institutions, at the
domestic and international level.
d. Goal: Durable Peace with Justice
Within the peace and justice dialogue, there is general consensus
today that both peace and justice are required for long-term stability
arising out of conflict and minimizing either aim threatens that
stability. Justice and accountability mechanisms cannot achieve
their objectives of deterrence and non-recurrence if peace is not
established. A weak peace without justice is likely to result in a
recurrence of the conflict. Peace negotiators need to “carve out space
for accountability and justice in order to achieve a durable peace.”200
The importance of justice for a durable peace can be seen in the
present day response to the Latin American transitions of power
during the twentieth century that emphasized peace without justice
through blanket amnesty for government perpetrators.201 Over the
last two decades, victims challenged these amnesty laws in domestic
Williams, supra note 149, at 453.
Williams, supra note 149, at 453; see also U.N. Security Council Res. 1315
(Aug. 14, 2002) (establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone).
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and regional courts.202 Domestic pressure and persistent calls for
accountability culminated in 2005, when the Argentine Supreme
Court of Justice formally declared blanket amnesties
unconstitutional and void. 203 Following in the footsteps of
Argentina, and in compliance with international law, Uruguay,
Peru, and El Salvador have all formally or informally annulled their
amnesty laws and are now bringing former regime perpetrators of
human rights atrocities to justice. 204 After several decades, the
survivors of these atrocity regimes continue to demand justice as a
core element of long term peace.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE VERSUS JUSTICE IN SUDAN
The seeds of Sudan’s peace versus justice dilemma have been
present since at least its independence in 1956. The manner in
which Sudan achieved independence—without autonomy for the
ethnically and religiously distinct South—embedded the seeds of
conflict in the future state, and the Three Tribes’ attempted
Islamization and Arabization throughout the country ensured that
justice would remain a demand of marginalized Sudanese in Darfur,
the South, and elsewhere in response to decades of state
oppression.205
a. Darfur Peace Process
As discussed in Part II, the Bashir regime engaged in a sustained
violent conflict against the people of the Darfur region. The conflict
intensified and the increasing numbers of internally displaced and
refugees caused neighboring countries and international actors,
such as Chad, the United Nations (UN), and the African Union (AU)
to attempt to bring peace between Sudan’s government and rebel
groups.206 On May 5, 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) also
See generally id.
Id. at 181.
204
Id. at 168-82.
205
See discussion of these conflicts supra Part II.
206
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known as the Abuja Agreement was signed by the government of
Sudan and one faction of rebel groups in Darfur known as the Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA), while other factions of the SLA refused to
sign.207 The failure to bring all parties together prevented the peace
agreement from operating as it was intended and the violence
continued. After four years of continued conflict and peace
negotiations, the government of Sudan and Liberation and Justice
Movement (LJM) signed what is known as the Doha Document for
Peace in Darfur (DDPD) or the Doha Agreement.208
i.

2006 Darfur Peace Agreement

The initial peace negotiation in late 2003 was conducted by
neighboring Chad in a form of ceasefire, which ultimately failed. 209
Sudan objected to the involvement of the US, European Union (EU),
and the UN in the negotiations but permitted the AU under the
limitation that the talks focus on humanitarian rather than political
issues. 210 Meanwhile, ceasefire agreements like the N’Djamena
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement were signed between Sudan
and the rebel groups; the AU formed the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS); and AMIS dispatched thousands of African
peacekeeping troops to Darfur. 211 By 2005, due to tribal
confrontation, internal politics, and differing views on the peace
negotiation, rebel groups had begun to split into factions.212 After
six rounds of peace talks in Abuja, Nigeria, the DPA, otherwise
assets.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/18_Sudan_2006_ENG_F.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A3GW-YWZF].
207
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https://unamid.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/old_dnn/VoD_En_July_2012
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known as the Abuja Agreement, was signed on May 5, 2006, by
Sudan and only one faction of SLM/A, SLA-MM led by Minni
Minnawi.213
The agreement was divided into six chapters outlining: Power
Sharing; Wealth Sharing; Comprehensive Ceasefire and Final
Security Arrangements; Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation;
General Provisions; and Implementation Modalities and
Timelines. 214 Due to Sudan’s condition that the negotiation only
address humanitarian issues, the agreement was limited to a general
peace mechanism rather than justice. 215 In this instance, the
agreement reflected a Peace First approach.
ii.

2011 Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

Due to the failure to unify the rebels and the continuation of
violence in Darfur, additional peace negotiations were necessary. In
July 2007, the AU and the UN established a hybrid operation known
as the United Nations—African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
(UNAMID).216 In October 2007, in an attempt to achieve goals that
were missed in the DPA and despite boycotting by SLA factions and
JEM, the UN and AU organized the Sirte Conference to negotiate
peace among the central government, rebels, and other civil society
groups.217 In 2008, Qatar confirmed that it would host the peace
negotiation in Doha.218 These meetings lasted until May 2011. A
coalition of small armed movements called the Liberation and
Justice Movement (LJM) participated in the talks, providing splinter
rebel groups with a united voice.219 SLA-AW, led by Abdelwahid
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Mohammed Ahmed Nur, refused to participate.220 JEM followed
suit and withdrew from the talks.221 The DDPD was finalized in
May 2011 and was signed between the government and LJM, to the
exclusion of other rebel groups.222
The DDPD was signed by the central government and LJM at the
All Darfur Stakeholders Conference on July 14, 2011.223 Similar to
the DPA, the DDPD outlined power sharing, wealth sharing,
permanent ceasefire, internal dialogue, and consultation and
implementation mechanisms. 224 However, unlike the DPA, the
DDPD was comprehensive and included justice mechanisms
through chapters on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Compensation and Return of IDPs and Refugees, and Justice and
Reconciliation. 225 Additionally, the DDPD was supported by
UNAMID, the African Union, and the Arab League, and endorsed
by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.226
The wealth sharing provision of the peace agreement created the
Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF), the Fiscal
and Financial Allocation Monitoring Commission (FFAMC), and the
Compensation Commission.227 The DRDF was designed to ensure
that the new Government of National Unity (GNU) would
contribute significant money to Darfur. 228 The DDPD stated that
Darfur would share in Sudan’s wealth and would benefit from a
nation-wide strategy for poverty alleviation. Specifically, the DDPD
designated that the Government of Sudan would transfer two billion
dollars to Darfur through the Darfur Reconstruction and
Development Fund (DRDF). 229 The amount allocated to DRDF
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would be adjusted based on reconstruction and developmental
needs in Darfur.230
The FFAMC was assigned to oversee financial transfers from
The Compensation
Khartoum to Darfur’s three states. 231
Commission was established to compensate all victims who
suffered loss or damage, including loss of life, physical injury,
mental harm, housing, and emotional suffering, “with membership
nominated by the parties, to define mechanisms for reviewing and
enforcing the Commissions’ decisions.” 232 Additionally, the
Sudanese government agreed to provide thirty million dollars to
victims of the conflict.233 Lastly, the agreement included plans to
establish a commission that would consult with the UN in assisting
displaced persons and refugees in returning home to Sudan.234
The security provision called for a ceasefire with consequences
for violation and withdrawal of armed groups from respective areas
and for demilitarized zones to be created around camps for IDPs.235
The rebels were not required to disarm until the Sudanese Armed
Forces withdrew and the GNU disarmed and had the Janjaweed
under control. 236 It was agreed that in groups of 100-150, 4,000
former combatants be integrated into the Sudanese Armed Forces,
1,000 be integrated into security institutions such as police forces,
and 3,000 would join education and training programs. Similarly,
the DDPD called for the disarmament, demobilization and
integration of former combatants into SAF and Police Forces.237
Unlike the DPA, the DDPD included justice provisions. The
DDPD established the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission
(TJRC). 238 The TJRC would have two committees (Justice
Committee and Truth and Reconciliation Committee) who would be
responsible for receiving, examining, and assessing claims of victims
and assessing the root of the conflict in order to provide
recommendations for comprehensive and lasting peace in Darfur.239
Those who committed violations of human rights and international
230
231
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humanitarian law would be held accountable by a Special Court for
Darfur to prosecute human rights violations.240 Amnesty was given
to certain civil and military members and to prisoners of war. 241 In
contrast, because of the Government of Sudan’s requirement that the
DPA peace negotiations only concern humanitarian issues, the DPA
failed to include any justice mechanisms.
In the years that followed the peace agreement, the security
situation in Darfur remained unstable due to the delayed
implementation of the DDPD. 242 Particularly, under the power
sharing provision, only half of the federal level posts granted to LJM
were satisfied and the vote on Darfur’s administrative status was
not conducted.243 In terms of the wealth sharing provision, due to
the economic crisis in Sudan, only $135 million had been made
available, but not deposited in the DRDF bank account, by late
2013.244 Under the security provisions, the integration of LJM forces
into government forces stalled due to disagreements over the
numbers, and the disarming of government militias was not
implemented.245
The DDPD reflected a comprehensive peace agreement with
peace and justice provisions, and it was backed by several
international organizations and foreign states with the ability to
fund and support the enforcement of peace and the administration
of justice. In many ways, the DDPD reflects the sequencing of a
Peace with Justice process and promised to set the foundation for a
durable peace. Unfortunately, the Bashir regime failed to fully
implement the DDPD, and that failure fueled the grievances that
gave rise to the April 2019 revolution that toppled Bashir.
b. North-South Peace Process
As discussed in Part II, conflict between what is now Sudan and
South Sudan stems back to the early 1800s upon the arrival of the
Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, supra note 223, art. 59.
Mollie Zapata, Darfur: The Doha Peace Process, December 2010-present,
ENOUGH (Jan. 10, 2012), https://enoughproject.org/blog/darfur-doha-peaceprocess-december-2010-present [https://perma.cc/C3DS-AEBV]; Doha Document
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Turko-Egyptians and the British subsequently after.246 Even after
Sudanese independence in 1956, Egypt and Britain’s legacy
catalyzed further cultural, religious, and economic differences
between the northern and southern regions that led to several civil
wars. The first civil war began a year before the country gained
independence in 1956. Upon independence, the northerners pressed
for one Sudan fully immersed in Arab-Islamic culture and opposed
the southern federation and the practice of Christianity and other
indigenous religions.247 Southern groups reiterated their cries for
self-determination, leading to a mutiny, which officially began the
war.248
i.

Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972

After seventeen years of fighting and even a military takeover,
the Addis Ababa Agreement ended the first civil war in 1972.249 The
agreement between Sudan’s new government under President
Numayri and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement granted
regional autonomy to the southern region. 250 Citizens of the
southern region were given the power to elect a People’s Regional
Council, which had full authority to legislate on all local matters.251
National matters, such as foreign trade and national defense, were
excluded from this regional authority.252 Following the agreement,
President Numayri appointed leaders from the South, such as
members of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement within his
government and established the Sudanese Socialist Union. 253 A
number of political parties in the northern region were unhappy
with President Numayri and the Addis Ababa Agreement because
246
Sam C. Sarkesian, The Southern Sudan: A Reassessment, 16 AFR. STUD. REV.
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247
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249
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250
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it did not advocate for one unified Arab-Islamic country. 254 A
number of Northerners also resented the southern region’s ability to
elect local government officials within the People’s Regional Council
while the northern region was under the repressive military
dictatorship of Numayri .255 Towards the end of the 1970s and early
1980s, Southerners, too, disapproved of President Numayri’s
actions, including President Numayri requiring the southern region
to split into three regions and creating an unwanted canal to
transport oil from the south to the north.256
President Numayri’s desire to control oil resources heightened
competition between political elites in the national government and
also increased division with the southern region. 257 Lingering
agitations from the first civil war illustrated by controversies over
the North-South border also increased tensions between the national
political elites and southerners. 258 Moreover, in September 1983,
President Numayri breached the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement by
enforcing Sharia law throughout the entire country, including the
southern region. 259 In response, John Garang and other southern
leaders created both the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.260
The Second Sudanese Civil War began in 1983 with a series of
military conflicts between the Southern People’s Liberation
Movement and the central Sudanese government. 261 Even after
President Numayri was overthrown in 1985 by a popular
uprising, 262 the North-South conflict continued as the Southern
People’s Liberation army fought against the civilian-led transitional
government and the government formed under Prime Minister alMahdi following elections in 1986. 263 Prime Minister al-Mahdi,
under the influence of the National Islamic Front, continued to
support the so-called “September Laws” that sought to make Sudan
an Islamic State and impose sharia law throughout the country.264
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
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Peace discussions renewed for a brief period beginning in 1986;
leaders from both sides of the conflict met in Ethiopia to discuss
peace in Sudan at the Koka Dam meeting and released the Koka
Dam Declaration which called for the lifting of the September laws,
the State of Emergency, and all other restrictive laws, and the
convening of a national peace conference with all the parties in June
1986. 265 Despite the government’s failure to implement the
provisions of the Koka Dam Declaration, John Durang, and the head
of the DUP Party met in Addis Ababa in 1988 and announced the
Sudanese Peace Initiative, a plan to host a constitutional conference
to discuss the situation in Sudan, and for a ceasefire and suspension
of the September Laws in the lead up to the conference.266 Al-Mahdi
was toppled by a military coup in June 1989 which led to the
dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir; the regimes of both al-Mahdi and alBashir effectively thwarted any opportunity for progress on peace
under the Koka Dam Declaration of Sudanese Peace Initiatives.267
Bashir’s regime didn’t merely thwart the opportunity for peace,
it escalated the Second civil war with the south by declaring Jihad
against southerners and turning the conflict into a “holy war.” 268
The regime sought to spread Islam through the Southern region of
the country and further into Africa, and the regime’s fighters who
died in the conflict were called martyrs and exalted. 269 By 2002,
Bashir and the National Congress Party (formerly the National
Islamic Front) agreed to enter into serious peace negotiations with
the Southern People’s Liberation Army.270 The lack of oil revenue
and the heavy pressure from the international community led both
parties to sign the Machakos Peace Agreement in Machakos, Kenya
in July 2002.271

Salman, supra note 248, at 373-74.
Salman, supra note 248, at 375.
267
Salman, supra note 248, at 376.
268
Salman, supra note 248, at 376.
269
Salman, supra note 248, at 376-77.
270
Salman, supra note 248, at 378.
271
See Salman, supra note 248, at 378 (examining the factors pushing the
government towards reaching a peaceful resolution of the conflict).
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Machakos Protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of
2005

The Machakos Protocol addressed the root causes of the civil
war in Sudan and provided Sudan a six-year interim period to create
comprehensive reforms in the system of governance.272 Specifically,
the Machakos Protocol is the flagship document of the six chapeau
agreement titled the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.273 In 2005,
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement officially terminated the
twenty-two year civil war in Sudan.274 The Comprehensive Peace
Agreement required that by “January 2011, a referendum on
independence be held, allowing the people of southern Sudan to
choose between . . . power-sharing . . . [under one central
government] or opting for full independence through secession
from the north . . . ,” the option which southerners had wanted at
the outset of Sudan’s independence from Britain in 1956.275 After a
six-month transition period, on July 9, 2011, South Sudan became an
independent State.276
Pressure from the international community, including the
United States, Nigeria, and neighboring countries within the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development, facilitated peace
processes to end the second civil war.277 Kenya hosted the entire
peace process from June 18 to July 20, 2002, for the Machakos
Protocol, but also for the entire span of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement.278 Mr. Daniel arap Moi, the former President of Kenya,
appointed General Lazaro Sumbeiywo as a full-time mediator
272
See Emeric Rogier, The (Un-) Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in NO MORE
HILLS AHEAD? THE SUDAN’S TORTUOUS ASCENT TO HEIGHTS OF PEACE 105, 105 (2005).
See also Marina Ottaway & Amr Hamzawy, The Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT
FOR
INT’L
PEACE
(2011),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/01/04/comprehensive-peace-agreementpub-42223 [https://perma.cc/7J8E-FWRY] (discussing the structure of the peace
agreement).
273
Salman, supra note 248, at 391.
274
See Ottaway & Hamzawy, supra note 272, at 1 (stating that Comprehensive
Peace Agreement was signed on January 9, 2005, and that it marked the end of the
two decades of civil conflict).
275
Ottaway & Hamzawy, supra note 272, at 2. See discussion supra Part II
regarding southerners’ desire for independence in 1956.
276
Ottaway & Hamzawy, supra note 272, at 344.
277
See Salman, supra note 248, at 412 (describing how multiple nations like the
United States and Nigeria facilitated negotiations to bring about peace).
278
Salman, supra note 248, at 378.
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between the Sudanese central government and the Southern
People’s Liberation Movement and Army. 279 The United States,
Norway, and the United Kingdom also assisted with mediation
under the guise of the troika.280
The Machakos Protocol is the first part of the six-part
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 281 In the Machakos Protocol,
both parties agreed on a broad framework for the transitional
process and the structures of government, State and religion, and
the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan.282
The first section of the Machakos Protocol outlines South
Sudan’s right of self-determination. 283 The Machakos Protocol
outlines that Sudan honors freedom of religion and belief and that
no one should be discriminated on such grounds generally nor
within public office.284 Further, the Protocol discusses that personal
and family matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance shall
not be governed by the specific party’s personal or religious laws.285
Next, the Machakos Protocol details the structures of
government. The National Constitution of Sudan is established as
the Supreme Law of the land within this agreement.286 Nonetheless,
the agreement highlights that Sudan will establish a National
Constitutional Review Commission to draft a Legal and
Constitutional Framework to incorporate the Machakos Protocol
and to govern Sudan during the Interim Period.287 The agreement
establishes alternative options for instances where national
legislation is enacted that conflicts with the religion of another.288
The Machakos Protocol ends with the introduction of the
Assessment and Evaluation Commission.289 The Machakos Protocol
establishes this commission to improve institutions and

Salman, supra note 248, at 412.
Salman, supra note 248, at 412.
281
Ottoway & Hamzawy, supra note 272, at 1.
282
U.N. Peacemaker, Machakos Protocol, Recitals, July 20, 2002,
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_020710_Machako
sProtocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPY9-A9YN].
283
Id. at §1.3.
284
Id. at §§6.2-6.3.
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Id. at §6.4.
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Id. at §3.1.1.
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Id. at §3.1.2.
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Id. at §3.2.4.
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Id. at §2.4.
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arrangements created under the agreement and to address pending
issues of power sharing, wealth sharing, and human rights.290
The Machakos Protocol is an interim agreement between the
Southern People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the
Sudanese government.291 The Machakos Protocol called for a sixand-a-half-year interim period where the local, state, and federal
government would rule over the country as a whole until the
southern region decided whether or not to depart from Sudan
through referendum.292 The Protocol also initiated a conversation
on the future of State and religion. 293 On July 20, 2002, the two
parties signed the Machakos Protocol under the supervision of
General Lazaro Sumbeiywo as a full-time mediator.294 The parties
also received mediation assistance from international parties, such
as Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda under the confederation of
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, along with
assistance from the aforementioned troika (United States, Norway,
and the United Kingdom).295
The Machakos Protocol does not directly address accountability
or justice mechanisms within the agreement. Further, the agreement
does not address any amnesty provisions or any form of transitional
justice. Political drivers may have contributed to the failure to
address justice provisions in the agreement. Scholars have
suggested that the Sudanese government hesitated in making a
grand compromise to get a better deal by negotiating in a piecemeal
manner. 296 Furthermore, SPLM/A’s concerns regarding the
administration of presidential elections influenced the content of the
Machakos Protocol and the timing of the peace process in Sudan.297
Specifically, the principle and timing of elections was a contentious
issue throughout and following the peace negotiations.298 Despite
these tensions and the failure of the CPA to address issues of justice,
Id.
Id. at Recitals.
292
Nicole Rumeau & Howard Wolpe, Sudan: Last Steps in the Peace Process,
WILSON CTR. (Sept. 3, 2003), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/sudan-laststeps-the-peace-process [https://perma.cc/LZH4-5NBA].
293
Oysten H. Rolandsen, A Quick Fix? A Retrospective Analysis of the Sudan
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 38 REV. OF AFR. POL. ECON. 554, 555 (2011).
294
Salman, supra note 248, at 412.
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the CPA has been described by the former US Special Envoy to
Sudan as “perhaps the most transformational document in modern
Sudanese history.”299
The Machakos Protocol and the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, of which it is a component part, reflect a Peace First
approach, where provisions about accountability and transitional
justice were not included so the parties could focus exclusively on
provisions necessary to end the violent conflict. In terms of the text
of the agreement, those requirements did not explicitly include
accountability. The fact that Bashir had already had an ICC arrest
warrant issued for his conduct in Darfur may have influenced this
result. Bashir had no incentive to broach accountability and the
SPLM may have felt that Bashir would eventually face justice. The
outcome reflects the benefits and drawbacks of a Peace First
approach. The CPA was widely understood to have been essential
to ending the Second North-South Civil War; however, the failure to
hold perpetrators of international crimes accountable meant that the
Bashir regime was able to continue committing war crimes against
others within Sudan.
V. PEACE AND JUSTICE IN THE JUBA PEACE AGREEMENT
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 ultimately led to
South Sudan’s secession, granting the South Sudanese the selfdetermination and autonomy that they had long sought. 300
Nevertheless, following the 2011 bifurcation of the two nations,
Bashir continued to oppress the remaining citizenry within Sudan
and he faced significant opposition to his regime.301 The internal
tension within Sudan ultimately led to Bashir’s toppling in April
2019, following months of country-wide protests led by the Forces
for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition.302 The military junta that
deposed Bashir also targeted the protesters who helped to topple
Bashir, killing several of them on June 3, 2020.303 As a result of this
massacre, the international community pressured the military

299
300
301
302
303

NATSIOS, supra note 11, at 170.
See discussion supra Parts II and IV.
See supra Part II.
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 208, at 7-9.
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 208, at 7-9.
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transitional government to negotiate with the civilian protesters and
to form a jointly-led transition government.304
a. 2019 Constitutional Declaration
The Transitional Military Council that toppled Bashir and the
Forces for Freedom and Change signed a transitional constitutional
declaration in August 2019 that established the civilian led
transitional government (“CLTG”), laid out its authorities, and
provided a timeline for the political transition.305 The peace process
was a key element of the political transition.306 Transitional justice
was also a priority reflected in the declaration. Article 38(5)(f) of the
Constitutional Declaration provides for the establishment of a
Transitional Justice Commission as part of the legal reform process
in Sudan.307 The Constitutional Declaration further provided that
Sudan shall begin implementing transitional justice and
accountability measures for crimes against humanity and war
crimes during the transitional period.308
The transformation of the Sudanese government’s composition
created space for the negotiation of peace with parties who had been
harmed by Bashir’s abuses on both sides of the negotiating table.309
The significance of this realignment for the pursuit of peace and
justice in tandem was apparent in the prioritization of transitional
justice in the Constitutional Declaration that created the new
transitional governance authority and set the terms for the political
transition. The prioritization of justice as part of the transition
continued when armed groups entered into negotiation with the
new CLTG.
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 208, at 7-9.
Draft Constitutional Charter for the 2019 Transitional Period, Aug. 4, 2019,
https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/201908/Sudan%20Constitutional%20Declaration%20%28English%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8PZ3-6MYN].
306
See, e.g., id. at art 6(2) (“During the first six months of the transitional
period, the priority is to work seriously to establish peace . . . .”).
307
Id. at art. 38(5)(f).
308
Id. at art. 67(g).
309
See INT’L IDEA, THE JUBA AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN SUDAN: SUMMARY AND
ANALYSIS 7 (2020), https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/thejuba-agreement-for-peace-in-sudan-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LPM-TLA6]
(noting that former opposition members were now in government and that made
reaching agreement easier).
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305
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b. Juba Declaration
The CLTG met with a coalition of armed rebels in October 2019
in Juba, South Sudan to initiate the peace process. 310 The rebel
groups had previously formed an umbrella political organization
known as the Sudan Revolutionary Forces (“SRF”) to collectively
represent the views of the geographically and ethnically distinct
armed movements, each of whom shared disdain for Bashir’s
regime.311 The SRF comprised groups from throughout Sudan, with
significant representation from the conflict areas of Darfur, as well
as the Two Areas of the Blue Nile and South Kordofan (“The Two
Areas”).312 The October 2019 Juba talks were their first opportunity
to negotiate with a post-Bashir regime.
The SRF and CLTG signed a joint Cessation of Hostilities and a
Joint Political Declaration (“Juba Declaration”) that laid out their
intentions to negotiate a peace agreement that would
comprehensively address their concerns within a three-month
period.313 The Juba Declaration reflected that the Juba peace process
was designed to unfold as a sequenced Peace with Justice endeavor.
In this case, the first step of the sequence emphasized peace, as the
Cessation of Hostilities was the key outcome of the Juba Declaration
and the only measure to take immediate effect.314 The Government
of Sudan’s transition to a civilian-led government, comprised of FFC
members who had been part of the opposition,315 created confidence
in the members of the SRF that they could achieve an appealing
political outcome.316 This confidence created the opportunity for the
parties to expressly address justice and accountability as an
intended outcome of the Juba peace process. The Juba Declaration
provided that the parties agreed to work towards “a comprehensive
and sustainable peace that discusses the root causes of the Sudanese
310
Denis Dumo, Sudan, major rebel group sign deal to integrate rebels into army,
REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2020, 6:54 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudanpolitics/sudan-major-rebel-group-sign-deal-to-integrate-rebels-into-armyidUSKCN25E1B9 [https://perma.cc/42V7-HLTG].
311
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 208, at 19.
312
INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 208, at 19.
313
Sudan Revolutionary Forces and Transitional Government Joint Cessation
of Hostilities and Joint Political Declaration (Oct. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Juba
Declaration].
314
Id.
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Marsden, supra note 5.
316
See INT’L IDEA, supra note 309, at 7.
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crisis, citizenship, justice, reconciliation, development and
democracy, marginalization, alleviation of suffering, reparations,
land issues, and the return of displaced persons as a priority.”317 The
parties also understood the importance of a durable Peace with
Justice declaring that “the realization of the objectives of the
Sudanese revolution of December 2018 necessitates the cessation of
conflict and war and achieving peace, justice, and a transition to
democracy.”318
c. Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan
While the Juba Declaration envisioned that the Juba peace
process would conclude within three months, the process ended up
taking a full year and a final comprehensive peace agreement was
concluded in October 2020. 319 The Juba Agreement for Peace in
Sudan, also known as the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), was a multitrack agreement with regional track agreements negotiated by
regional constituent groups of the SRF with the CLTG. 320 The
comprehensive agreement comprised six separate track agreements
signed by the Sudanese government and individual rebel groups —
The Darfur Peace Agreement, the Blue Nile and Kordofan Peace
Agreement, the Eastern Path Peace Agreement, the Northern Path
Peace Agreement, the Central Path Peace Agreement, the Third
Front Security Agreement, and a National Issues Agreement (along
with “final” agreement status provisions) signed by all of the
parties.321 Two rebel groups, SPLM North Al Hillu and the Sudan
Liberation Movement, did not sign the agreement.322 SPLM North
Al Hillu attended the negotiations in Juba and expressed interest in
negotiating their own track agreement, but insisted on a
commitment from the Sudanese government that Sudan would
become a secular state before negotiations could begin and they
failed to receive that precondition. 323 The Sudan Liberation
Juba Declaration, supra note 313, ¶ 1.
Juba Declaration, supra note 313, ¶ 4.
319
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2.
320
See generally INT’L IDEA, supra note 309 (analyzing the nuances of the Juba
Agreement for Peace in Sudan); Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2.
321
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 319.
322
INT’L IDEA, supra note 309, at 12.
323
INT’L IDEA, supra note 309, at 12.
317
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Movement did not attend the Juba peace process because it did not
recognize the CLTG as a legitimate government due to the
membership of former regime military officials in the body. 324
Nonetheless, the final provisions of the Juba Peace Agreement
contained provisions which would allow non-signatories to later
join the agreement with the approval of the original signatories.325
In terms of peace and justice, the multi-track peace agreement
explicitly addressed issues of transitional justice and accountability
as called for in the Juba Declaration and it established a permanent
ceasefire with signatory armed groups upon conclusion of the
agreement. 326 A sequenced Peace with Justice approach was
reflected in the negotiation’s outcome documents. The final Juba
Peace Agreement provides for various transitional justice
obligations and mechanisms on the national and regional level, and
in particular within the context of the Darfur Track Peace
Agreement. 327 The following subsections describe the specific
transitional justice provisions contained within the JPA.
i.

National Issues Agreement

Article 19(1) of the National Issues Agreement states that the
Parties shall form a Transitional Justice Commission within thirty
days of the date of signing the JPA, provided that the transitional
justice mechanism encompasses all of Sudan, and particularly the
conflict areas.328 In accordance with the National Issues Agreement
Implementation Matrix, the Government of Sudan must issue a
decision or decree to establish the Commission.329 In addition to the
Transitional Justice Commission, the National Issues Agreement
calls for general legal reform and grants a general amnesty “for
passed rulings and standing warrants against political leadership

INT’L IDEA, supra note 309, at 12.
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 8, art. 8.
326
Provisions for a permanent ceasefire with the relevant signatories were
included in the Darfur Agreement (tit. 2, art. 12), the Blue Nile and Kordofan
Agreement (tit. 3, ch. 2, art. 26), and the Third Front—Tamazuj Agreement (tit. 7,
art. 15.1). Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2.
327
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2
328
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 1, art. 19(1).
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Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 9.
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and members of armed movements in relation to their membership
therein.”330
On November 12, 2020, seemingly in implementation of this
provision, the Sovereign Council granted a general amnesty for
anyone who participated in armed or military operations during the
war, including the political leadership and members of the armed
movements and members of the Sudanese regular forces—the
amnesty does not apply to those who are wanted by the ICC, those
who committed war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide
since 2002, and those involved in litigation for a private right.331
ii.

Darfur Track Agreement

The Darfur Track Peace Agreement contains the most
comprehensive provisions on transitional justice of the various track
agreements. Specifically, the Darfur Track Agreement establishes
obligations regarding the ICC and calls for the creation of
transitional justice mechanisms such as the Darfur Special Court, the
Truth and Reconciliation Committee, and the Compensation and
Reparations Fund.332 The Agreement also calls for memorialization
and the use of traditional justice mechanisms.333 The Darfur Track
Agreement also addresses transitional justice as it relates to
displaced persons and land issues.334
The Darfur Track Agreement recognizes that the pursuit of
justice, accountability, and reconciliation precludes the possibility of
any amnesty or immunity for perpetrators of genocide, crimes
against humanity, or war crimes and creates an obligation to ensure
that all perpetrators of violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law are held accountable pursuant to the jurisdiction

Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 1, art. 17.
Ali Agab and Olivia Bueno, Sudan’s Recent Amnesty Resolution Undermines
the Prospects for Accountability and Peace, INT’L JUST. MONITOR (Nov. 25, 2020),
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2020/11/sudans-recent-amnesty-resolutionundermines-the-prospects-for-accountability-and-peace/
[https://perma.cc/5BHH-GWAG] (noting that the wording of the amnesty may
have only excluded those already charged by the ICC with committing international
crimes).
332
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 2, ch. 3.
333
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334
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of domestic courts, the ICC, or the Darfur Special Court. 335 The
Agreement further recognizes the right of victims to have
unhindered access to effective justice and redress mechanisms as
well as the special status and role of women, children, and youth
and their issues, in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in
transitional justice processes. 336 Furthermore, the Agreement
stresses the importance of local and indigenous methods of truthtelling, justice, reconciliation, and healing in complementing formal
processes of justice and reconciliation.337
The Agreement provides for the Parties’ full and unlimited
cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) concerning
persons for whom arrest warrants have been issued, which includes
facilitating the appearance of those wanted before the ICC and
committing to UN Security Council Resolution 1593. 338 The
Agreement additionally provides that the Parties shall ensure that
ICC prosecutors and investigators have easy access to victims,
witnesses, and investigation sites, as well as free movement
throughout Sudan at all times.339 In addition, the Parties agreed to
not interfere with the investigations and trials conducted by the ICC
and to ensure the protection and safety of all prosecutors, victims,
and witnesses.340
The Darfur Track Peace Agreement provides for the
establishment of the Darfur Special Court to prosecute genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and gross violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law since 2002 in
Darfur. 341 The Agreement specifies that the Court shall be
established within ninety days of signing and shall continue
operations for ten years from the date of its establishment.342 The
Court shall be composed of Sudanese judges appointed by the head
of the judiciary as well as an independent prosecutor appointed by
the Attorney General upon the approval of the Parties to the
Agreement.343 The Parties further agreed that a team of experts and
specialists from the African Union shall monitor the Court’s
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343

Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 2, ch. 3.
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 2, ch. 3.
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 2, ch. 3.
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 2, ch. 3, para. 24.
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 2, ch. 3, para. 24.
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 2, ch. 3, para. 24.
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 2, ch. 3, para. 25.
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 2, tit. 2, ch. 3, para. 25.
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procedures. 344 The Darfur Special Court will apply Sudanese
criminal law and international criminal law in relation to war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.345
Additionally, the Agreement provides for the establishment of
the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC), which shall have the
mandate to identify and assess the root causes of conflicts in Darfur,
investigate broad violations, crimes, and human rights abuses, hold
hearings, receive testimonies and statements from victims,
witnesses, local communities, interest groups, or persons directly or
indirectly involved in events, store evidence, create a
comprehensive record of all crimes and forms of violations, and
report its findings with recommendations to the regional
government of Darfur, among other tasks.346 The TRC was set to be
established within sixty days of signing the Agreement and be
composed of independent members selected jointly by the Parties
who have extensive experience in human rights, transitional justice
and/or truth and reconciliation.347
The Agreement empowers traditional justice mechanisms in
Darfur to penalize individuals who committed offenses related to
the conflict or to the perpetuation of intra-tribal and inter-tribal
conflicts.348 The jurisdiction of traditional justice mechanisms will
include all offenses related to the conflicts that fall outside the
jurisdiction of the ICC, the Darfur Special Court, the national
judiciary of Sudan, and the TRC.349 Traditional justice mechanisms
must refer all cases outside of their jurisdiction to other competent
justice mechanisms. 350 The Agreement provides that traditional
justice mechanisms must exercise traditional competencies, employ
both customary substantive laws and customary procedural rules,
and respect the due process rights of the accused.351
The Parties moreover agreed to establish memorials honoring
the victims of the conflicts in Darfur.352 Memorialization may take
many forms, including but not limited to annual public ceremonies,

344
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museums, documentation centers, or monuments.353 Additionally,
the memorials for victims shall be designed to promote
reconciliation. 354 The Parties agreed to engage in popular
consultations and dialogue with all levels of society in Darfur to
identify collective goals for the memorialization project.355
The Darfur Track Peace Agreement also provides for the
establishment of the Compensation and Reparations Fund to receive
and address compensation and reparation decisions issued by the
relevant mechanisms. 356 The Parties agreed that the Fund shall
make its own regulations, rules, procedures, and decision-making
methods. 357 The Agreement further provides that women must
comprise at least forty percent of the functional structure of the
Fund. 358 Under the Darfur Track Agreement, reparations can
include, among other things, the right to seek compensation for lost
property, lost livelihood, death in the family, personal injury, and
other trauma or damages, whether psychological or physical,
resulting from the conflict in Darfur.359
iii.

Two Areas Track Agreement

The Two Areas Track Agreement (Blue Nile and South
Kordofan) (“Two Areas”) provides for relatively limited transitional
justice obligations and mechanisms.360 The Parties to the Agreement
agree to the establishment of the national Transitional Justice
Mechanism as well as a regional branch of the Commission in the
Two Areas. 361 The Agreement additionally provides a fund
concerned with the affairs of martyrs and wounded persons in the
Two Areas.362 As part of the Agreement, the Parties also agreed to
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the establishment of a national ministry for peace and human rights
and a national commission for religious freedom.363
The only party among the SRF coalition that did not sign the
group is SPLM/Al Hillu.364 They objected to the negotiation itself,
because get they wanted a commitment from the CLTG that Sudan
would become a secular state. 365 Negotiations to incorporate Al
Hillu, which controls a significant portion of territory within the
Their engagement and
Two Areas, remains ongoing. 366
incorporation within the JPA would be a major advancement in
addressing issues of justice within the Two Areas. In the author’s
view, the fact that SPLM North Al Hillu did not negotiate a track
agreement was a likely reason that the Two Areas Track Agreement
language on transitional justice was so sparse in contrast to the
detailed language of the Darfur Track Agreement. The signatories
of the Two Areas Track Agreement likely felt that they did not have
the ability to make binding commitments for the vast territory in the
Two Areas that they do not control.
d. Juba Peace Agreement: A Peace with Justice Approach
Because the Juba Agreement is a multi-track peace agreement,
consisting of various regional agreements, the provisions on justice
greatly vary. Darfur and the Two Areas, two regions with armed
movements, and whose people had been subjected to mass atrocities
by the Bashir regime, ultimately had very different justice
provisions in their track agreements. As noted above, the Two Areas
justice provisions were fairly limited, likely due to the absence of
SPLM-N Al Hillu in the negotiations. Darfur’s justice mechanisms
were the most comprehensive and in the author’s view, reflected the
fact that Darfur negotiators were well-prepared and came into the
negotiations with clear positions across the range of transitional
justice issues. This preparation and clear vision of justice enabled
the parties to reach clear agreements on the comprehensive nature
of transitional justice in Darfur. As noted previously, the Darfur
Juba Peace Agreement, supra note 319, at tit. 3.
INT’L IDEA, supra note 309, at 12.
365
INT’L IDEA, supra note 309, at 12.
366
Sudan gov’t and SPLM-N sign agreement to pave way for peace talks, AL JAZEERA
(March 28, 2021), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/28/sudan-andmain-rebel-group-sign-agreement-to-restart-peace-talks
[https://perma.cc/W2LT-UE2D].
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region negotiators were also aided by the fact there were friendly
parties in the FFC from Darfur who were part of the CLTG, and as
such they were often negotiating with like-minded associates. This
did not obviate the fact that the CLTG has amongst its membership
military officials who had also been part of the Bashir regime and
who had arguably committed atrocities themselves. The amnesty
agreement announced by the Sovereign Council was likely a
prophylactic for any fear that these officials might have regarding
any personal criminal liability.367 Despite the personal interests of
some of the participants, the parties were able to come to an
agreement on a comprehensive transitional justice framework in
Darfur and a general framework for transitional justice at the
national level.
The Darfur agreement justice framework contained multiple and
sequenced mechanisms which reflected a Peace with Justice
approach. The potential for Bashir and his close allies to face
international criminal accountability from the ICC was a strong
reinforcing tool for the incorporation of justice into the agreement.368
The Darfur Track Agreement made clear, the parties must cooperate
and actively support ICC investigations and indictments. 369 The
existence of the ICC warrants for Bashir and other regime officials
may have acted as an influential external mechanism, convincing
even those former military regime elements within the CLTG to
cooperate with the incorporation of justice into the peace process.370
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Juba Peace Agreement includes provisions that reflect
a framework for Peace with Justice in Sudan, to achieve the goal of
a durable Peace with Justice, the accountability and transitional
justice measures will need to be implemented in a holistic manner
in the context of Sudan’s political transition process, which includes
national and regional elections, the constitution-making process,
and long-term peace building—which in turn includes institution
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See discussion supra Part II on Bashir’s ICC warrants.
369
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building, institutional reform, and democratic norm building
throughout the state.
International institutions will also shape Sudan’s transition. The
International Criminal Court’s indictment of Bashir loomed in the
backdrop of the peace negotiations. Sudanese authorities have met
with the ICC Prosecutor about ensuring that Bashir faces
accountability either at the ICC, a hybrid court, or in a Special Court
for Crimes in Darfur provided for in the Juba Peace Agreement.371
States will also play a critical role in supporting Sudan’s peaceful
path forward, including supporting the peace process and a postBashir state committed to democracy, transparency, and
accountability. The United States’ lifting of terrorism sanctions
following the conclusion of the Juba Peace Agreement is an
important step in shoring up the national economy and signaling
support for the peace process and political transition.
Post-authoritarian political transitions are challenging and can
face significant setbacks.372 Despite the setback to Sudan’s political
transition caused by the October 2021 military coup,373 there is still
room to hope for the emergence of a peaceful, diverse democracy in
Sudan that respects human rights and justice. The participants in
the Juba peace process were able to leverage political space gained
in the wake of Bashir’s removal and the creation of the CLTG to
prioritize transitional justice within their peace process and political
transition. This prioritization of Peace with Justice was consistent
from the establishment of the CLTG’s transitional mandate in the
August 2019 Constitutional Declaration through the completion of
371
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Egypt and Tunisia, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1013-27 (discussing tensions
between secular and Islamist groups during Egypt’s Arab Spring transition and the
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transitions in Libya and Yemen following the Arab Spring devolved into civil war).
373
Shortly before this Article went to print, former regime officials had
committed a military coup against the Civilian led government. Jen Kirby, The coup
in Sudan, explained, VOX (Oct. 29, 2021, 2:20 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2021/10/29/22751437/sudan-coup-protests-al-burhanhamdok [https://perma.cc/MFY2-JFFP].

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

240

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 43:1

the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020. Because of that
commitment, the Juba Peace Agreement’s roadmap to a durable
peace remains. The 2019 popular revolution in Sudan helped create
this unique opportunity for peaceful advancement. The author’s
most fervent hope is that the Sudanese people, with the support of
the international community, will be able to quickly return to the
peaceful transition with justice that they so deeply deserve.
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